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The paper reviews the case for a strong multilateral response to the global crisis in 
emerging markets (EMs). It discusses modalities and feasibility of intervention 
and its associated risks, depending on country circumstances of fiscal space and 
liquidity needs. The specific role of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in 
ensuring the development effectiveness of the fiscal response is also discussed. 
The paper concludes by highlighting the international financial architecture issues 
raised by the global crisis that cannot be addressed immediately but will need to 
be dealt with once the current crisis has been tamed. 
 
JEL Classifications:  F3, F33, F53 
Keywords:  Global Crisis, Latin America and Caribbean, Multilateral 
Development Banks, Policy Responses.  
                                                       
1 Paper prepared for the IDB XXVIII Meeting of the Latin American Network of Central Banks and Finance 
Ministries. The views expressed in this paper are of the authors and may not represent those of the Inter-American 
Development Bank or its Executive Board. 1. Introduction 
 
To respond successfully to the ongoing global economic crisis, emerging economies require 
significant multilateral assistance. Several countries in emerging Europe are already in “crisis 
resolution” mode, and assistance is now focused on containing the fallout, but for much of Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC) there is still time for “active prevention” to pay significant 
dividends. But the challenges remain large; the total public sector borrowing requirements of the 
seven largest economies of LAC are estimated at some US$640 billion for 2009-2010, while 
these countries’ international gross reserves stood at about US$450 billion at end June 2008 
(IDB, 2009a). Given strong trade linkages with the epicenter of the crisis (the United States and 
Europe), emerging Asia’s position is arguably at least as fragile as that of LAC, but confidence is 
underpinned in Asia by Japan’s and China’s reserve position. 
Moreover, as widely discussed after the Asian crisis, emerging economies are more 
constrained in terms of their monetary, fiscal and lender of last resort responses than their 
industrialized country counterparts.
2 It is almost a definition of being emerging that domestic 
government bonds are not seen as a riskless asset, especially in these circumstances. As the 
probability of a crisis at home rises, money tends to flow out of the economy to foreign assets as 
investors, particularly larger and more sophisticated ones, seek a perceived safe haven. This 
implies countercyclical monetary policy, especially through the direct use of the central bank 
balance sheet. Such a policy, however, as currently being undertaken in advanced economies, 
may well de-anchor inflation expectations.
3 It also implies a sharper trade-off between financial 
stability and monetary stability, as injections of liquidity to the financial system may simply fuel 
capital flight, causing exchange rate depreciation and monetary instability. This in turn implies 
that financing a countercyclical fiscal policy will become increasingly expensive and risky as 
domestic interest rates rise, maturities shorten and more debt is issued in foreign currency—
assuming such markets even remain open.  International reserves could be used instead, but only 
at the cost of exercising the insurance option they represent, and hence at the risk of higher 
probability of a sudden stop or a currency crisis run down the road.  At the limit, sole reliance on 
domestic policy tools at the individual country level may well result in a worsening of the 
situation rather than ameliorating it. 
                                                       
2 See G20 (1998) on crisis prevention. 
3 See Calvo (2006) on monetary policy in EMs.   5
Discussion continues as to the true source of the current crisis.  However, whether it is 
considered microeconomic in nature and related to a sequence of regulatory failures in the 
world’s financial system, or fundamentally a macroeconomic phenomenon related to global 
imbalances feeding a housing boom and financial bubbles, it is clear that this crisis did not start 
in emerging economies. Moreover, the crisis is global and may well be prolonged. If there is a 
sharp V-shape recovery, the pain will most certainly be less. However, in the midst of wide 
uncertainty among analysts, it looks increasingly plausible that the recovery may be slower: at 
least a “U” if not the extremely worrisome “L”.  To the extent that core financial markets are not 
performing well, emerging economies may find it increasingly difficult to roll over both public 
and private sector liabilities. While financing a fiscal deficit or investment is a flow issue, rolling 
over outstanding liabilities is a problem of stocks. The more prolonged the crisis in financial 
markets, the greater the concern that emerging economies will have to deal with their stocks of 
liabilities, and the greater the adjustment that will be required if that cannot be achieved. In 
somewhat similar vein to the Asian crisis, such a problem would be the counterpart of a 
quintessential Sudden Stop.
4   
Nonetheless, there remains the conviction that individual countries are able (and ought to 
be able) to weather the storm alone, and this conviction is held both among certain quarters of 
the international policy community and, above all, among emerging economy officials 
themselves. On the one hand, it is often argued that countries should have done more to prepare 
themselves for a rainy day, and on the other hand there is extreme reluctance to seek early 
assistance from the IMF on the part of national authorities in many countries. These views are 
both contradictory and shortsighted. It is difficult to argue that in good times individual countries 
should have accumulated reserves sufficient to self-insure against the possibility of a systemic 
event like the crisis that has materialized—and if they had done so, they surely would surely 
have been accused of pursuing mercantilist exchange rate policies. Moreover, self-insurance is a 
second-best option relative to insurance through international cooperation. Similarly, the 
reluctance to enter into a precautionary arrangement with the IMF under the current 
circumstances is akin to a troupe of trapeze artists deciding not to have a safety net for fear that 
the circus manager will assume they do not have the requisite skill.
5  
                                                       
4 See Cavallo and Izquierdo (2009). 
5 Note that with no safety net in place the audience might also be in danger as other countries may be affected by a 
crisis in a neighbor that might have had a precautionary facility in place.    6
However, it is also the case that emerging economies are highly heterogeneous.  We 
suggest below a broad working categorization.  Based on this scheme, we suggest the types of 
multilateral support that should be made available. We argue below that there should be two 
overarching objectives for multilateral support.  The first is to reduce the likelihood of a country 
suffering a Sudden Stop in capital flows and hence a deep crisis as a reaction to the stock 
adjustment problem.  The second is to maximize the number of countries that might safely 
pursue some type of countercyclical fiscal policy as called for by the G20. The greater the 
number of countries that pursue such a policy, the more effective such policies become, as at the 
limit the “leakage” from a global package is zero.  Moreover, we suggest a division of labor 
between the International Monetary Fund and Multilateral Development Banks in providing 
multilateral support.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the case for a strong 
multilateral response to the global crisis in emerging markets (EMs), and in Section 3 we discuss 
modalities of intervention and associated risks.  The specific role of Multilateral Development 
Banks is discussed in Section 4. The question of the financial feasibility of such a multilateral 
response is dealt with in Section 5. The paper concludes with a discussion of the international 
financial architecture issues raised by the global crisis that cannot be addressed immediately but 
will need to be dealt with once the current crisis has been tamed. 
       
2.  Why Should Multilaterals Intervene? 
 
The rationale for multilateral intervention in response to the global crisis in emerging markets is 
now fairly well understood. Nonetheless, opposition to a forceful and assertive response is still 
strong, both in certain quarters of the international policy community and in some individual 
countries. This is evidenced by the relatively late and limited financial resources with which 
potential creditor countries have come forth in supporting multilateral financial institutions, as 
well as the reluctance with which emerging countries have requested access to those resources. It 
is therefore worthwhile to review the case before discussing the modalities and risks of such 
intervention.   7
2.1  Limits of Traditional Policy Instruments 
 
As private sector financial institutions hoard liquidity and investors seek the perceived safety of 
US government liabilities, there are severe financing constraints on emerging economies’ policy 
responses to the crisis. The optimal response to the crisis in an emerging economy is similar in 
nature to the one of more advanced economies. However, while the United States faces its most 
severe financial crisis since the Great Depression, funding costs for the US Government have 
actually fallen. Other advanced countries enjoy a similar position, albeit to a lesser extent. But 
this is not the case in EMs. In general, EMs are facing higher interest rates on domestic 
government debt and higher spreads over risk-free rates than before the crisis, and both are 
significantly higher than in industrialized economies. 
An interesting apparent exception is Chile. At least initially, after the collapse of 
Lehmann Brothers, when the crisis truly became global there appeared to be a flight to quality 
within Chile towards domestic Government bonds in local currency and in local currency 
indexed to inflation.  Rates on domestic bonds actually fell.  Of course Chile is an outlier in Latin 
America in several respects, most notably for its low level of public sector debt and the large 
magnitude of Central Bank and fiscal reserves constituted in foreign assets.  Indeed it might be 
argued that this flight to domestic public sector assets is the antithesis of being an emerging 
economy, and it is tempting to suggest a new answer to the old question of the optimal level of 
reserves: namely, the level that leads to a response to crisis such as seen in Chile. As we argue 
above, however, it would be grossly inefficient for all countries to maintain such a level of 
reserves. Nonetheless, while not optimal for all, Chile’s case does illustrate the potential power 
of unconditional access to a large stock of reserves under the current circumstances. 
 
2.1.1 Fiscal Policy 
 
In most cases it is not feasible to respond to the crisis with fiscal stimulus, let alone with quasi-
fiscal credit support policies, without multilateral support.  Even countries with sustainable fiscal 
policies might still face a relevant trade-off between expansionary policies and liquidity 
considerations. As we noted above, only a handful of emerging economies may be strong enough 
both from a fiscal sustainability and international liquidity perspective to pursue expansionary 
fiscal policies without risk. In fact, in some countries, fiscal adjustment as opposed to fiscal 
stimulus may be the “optimal” policy response to the crisis—particularly in the absence of a   8
multilateral backstop because, under certain conditions, a fiscal contraction can be expansionary 
(Giavazzi and Pagano, 1989).   
To fix ideas, consider the potential impact of two alternative fiscal policies in a country 
with no fiscal sustainability problems: one neutral towards the business cycle (i.e., no changes in 
either government expenditures or tax rates in response to recessionary pressures), and the other 
countercyclical (i.e., a rise in government expenditures and/or a reduction in tax rates). Since 
active fiscal policy will in principle imply a larger deterioration of the fiscal deficit, this deficit 
will add to the gross financing needs of the country, possibly affecting negatively the maturity 
and cost of this financing, i.e., shorter terms and higher rates. Therefore, a countercyclical fiscal 
policy implies deterioration in liquidity ratios relative to the neutral fiscal policy stance (IDB, 
2009a), and even countries with sizable international reserves to back these policies would find it 
risky to use a sizable portion of their self-insurance policy. 
Other countries in the region, may not even have the luxury of considering these 
tradeoffs, or can only do so at substantially higher downside risks. In fact, given the pro-cyclical 
fiscal policies pursued in many countries during the expansionary phase of the 2000s (on average 
LAC-7 countries increased public expenditures by 80 cents out of every additional dollar of 
revenue between 2003 and 2007, as discussed in IDB, 2008), pursuing a countercyclical policy 
during the downturn, which implies raising expenditures even further, may imply exponential 
debt dynamics, creating fiscal sustainability problems. In these cases countercyclical fiscal 
policies should simply not be an option (or may well be an option that becomes very costly ex 
post), unless there is a credible commitment to tighter fiscal discipline in the future.
6 
Of course, other forms of shoring up future fiscal discipline would also serve the same 
purpose of relaxing the fiscal sustainability constraint. For example, there is evidence in G7 
countries that discretionary counter-cyclical policy is asymmetric and generates debt bias, while 
automatic stabilizers such as unemployment insurance do not (IMF, 2008). The reason is that 
automatic stabilizers are temporary but discretionary policy tends not be rolled over after the 
downturn. It is important to introduce automaticity in fiscal policy (contingent rules) so that 
discipline becomes more credible. More generally, addressing some of the long-term imbalances 
                                                       
6 As we argue below, a key reform in this direction would be the establishment of an independent fiscal council in 
charge of estimating the structural fiscal balances actually run by governments and a budget rule setting prudent 
targets for these balances. A credible reform in this direction with a real bite in the future would allow countries and 
multilateral institutions to go further in any active policy in the present.   9
such as a deficit in social security would also help to shore up sustainability and open more space 
for fiscal action in the downturn. 
 
2.1.2 Monetary Policy  
 
Most emerging market countries are today better positioned than in the past to allow the 
exchange rate to absorb the initial impact of the global crisis. For instance, the “fear-of-floating” 
coefficient in the monetary policy rule of many emerging markets has decreased significantly in 
most countries (Ortiz, Ottonello and Sturzenegger, 2009).  This is partly related to smaller 
foreign exchange exposures, but also to the monetary policy credibility acquired through the 
implementation of flexible inflation targeting regimes for more than a decade. Indeed, in the 
same sample of countries, the speed with which central banks react to shocks (which is inversely 
related to measures of commitment to a given monetary policy stance) decreased significantly in 
most of the countries that recently adopted an inflation targeting regime.   
The greater policy flexibility at the onset of the crisis is important. Past experience 
suggests that initial conditions are crucial in terms of the policy flexibility necessary to minimize 
the likelihood of, or mitigate the impact of, sudden stops on economic activity (Cavallo and 
Izquierdo, 2009). Both theory (e.g., Benigno et al., 2009; and Braggion, Christiano, and Roldos, 
2005) and new evidence (Ortiz, Ottonello and Sturzenegger, 2009) show that the ability to 
pursue expansionary monetary policies in periods of financial turmoil can reduce the size of 
output contractions.  A flexible exchange rate response would have several additional benefits in 
addition to leaving more room for other uses of scarce international reserves. First, it would 
prevent the loss of market share in the context in which downward pressure on the nominal 
exchange rate is global. Second, it may help contain the deflationary impact of commodity price 
decline in those cases in which deflation pressure were to emerge (Catão and Chang, 2009). 
Nevertheless, exchange rate flexibility is not a silver bullet. Unlike in previous episodes 
of country-specific Sudden Stops, this is a global event. Not all countries can depreciate, and the 
global nature of the present shock means that devaluations may not have significant 
expansionary effects even in the absence of adverse balance sheet effects.  For most EMs, even if 
a flexible exchange rate response could be effected the economy would need an additional policy 
instrument to help contain the output gap opened up by the external shock.     10
Indeed, the nature of the shock imposes an important constraint. First, the global nature 
of the Sudden Stop faced by emerging capital markets and the concern regarding financial 
systems across the globe limits the use of the financial system as a vehicle for countercyclical 
monetary policy.  Banks in many emerging countries are currently holding large amounts of 
liquidity and are unlikely to respond to a reduction in interest rates to expand credit as in normal 
times. Similarly, a reduction in liquidity or reserve requirements is also likely to be met by even 
higher levels of liquidity rather than increases in credit.
7 Moreover, to the extent to which the 
shock faced by emerging markets has a permanent component (i.e., deleveraging is not 
temporary), a monetary policy response that aims at preserving the pre-shock equilibrium would 
not be desirable either. In some countries, however, lowering benchmark interest rates might 
support valuations of riskier assets and also lower the total cost of borrowing for households and 
firms, and hence ultimately contain the likelihood of generalized insolvency. Through this 
channel, monetary policy can contribute effectively toward containing the negative spillovers 
from the real sector to the financial sector of the economy (Mishkin, 2009). However, this 
potential benefit must be weighed against the potential risk of the effect of lower interest rates on 
capital flows.   
A second limit is imposed by the risk of losing credibility by attempting to use directly 
the central bank balance sheet in domestic currency to respond to the shock. A powerful 
additional instrument through which central banks in advanced economies are responding to the 
crisis is the direct use of their balance sheet to substitute for markets and intermediaries that are 
impaired, so-called quantitative easing. This means lending directly in domestic currency, and in 
a potentially unlimited manner, to the private sector, as opposed to loosening the funding 
conditions of the core domestic financial system through price signals to implement a more 
accommodative monetary stance. A key challenge to implementing such a policy is how to 
prevent inflation expectations from running out of control; and the risk of de-anchoring inflation 
expectations is much higher in emerging markets because of weaker policy institutions and their 
past histories of monetary instability. In emerging markets, therefore, aggressive quantitative 
easing in domestic currency would inevitably set off inflationary expectations, thus squandering 
                                                       
7 Monetary policy lags may be shorter in emerging markets than in advanced economies, hence making it more 
effective (Catão, Pagán and Laxton, 2008). The shorter duration of financial contracts, possibly underpinning this 
stylized fact, however, makes these economies more vulnerable to sudden increases in risk premia, thus suggesting 
that financial frictions may result in tougher constraints in these economies.      11
their recently hard-won inflation-fighting credibility, and thereby fuelling a flight to safer 
currencies. In emerging markets, quantitative easing (or more conventionally called, lending of 
last resort) must therefore be conducted in hard currency, using either own or borrowed reserves 
(Calvo, 2009).
8  
Most inflation-targeting central banks outside emerging Europe have lowered their 
reference rate in line with inflation, which is declining globally. Unlike in the more advanced 
economies, as inflation subsides, there may be room for emerging central banks to seek 
additional interest rate reductions within inflation-targeting frameworks.  Indeed, recent analyses 
of optimal policy in the presence of financial frictions suggest that a tightening of domestic 
financial market conditions should be met by responding more than normally to the output gap 
(e.g., Cúrdia and Woodford, 2008). Naturally, a central bank must weigh the case for such a 
reduction against the potential for capital flight and exchange rate instability when this is a 
constraint on the monetary policy framework.    
 
2.2 Benefits of Multilateral Intervention 
 
Having reviewed the limits to individual countries’ ability to respond to the global crisis, we now 
move on to discuss the possible global benefits of a multilaterally supported response. 
Countercyclical multilateral lending is needed to sustain access to external finance after 
excessive market retrenchment. In so doing, multilateral intervention bridges short-term 
financing needs and covers liquidity risks while the temporary market disruption lasts. This kind 
of intervention contains the damage to fundamentals that a full-blown liquidity crisis would 
provoke and relaxes the constraints on national policies facing the downturn. For example, 
multilateral intervention may back up international reserves, freeing them for policy uses or 
directly financing countercyclical fiscal policy. 
Apart from partially offsetting the external shock suffered by each country and 
empowering domestic policies, multilateral intervention addresses systemic dimensions that are 
crucial in a global crisis.  First, providing abundant multilateral financing to respond to the crisis 
is desirable from both the individual country viewpoint and, especially, the global perspective. 
As long as the international trade regime remains open, there are positive externalities from 
sustaining aggregate demand. Moreover, the growth payoff from fiscal stimulus rises with the 
                                                       
8 Calvo (2009) points out that a global financial regulator should be established alongside a global lender of last 
resort to be effective, in analogy with the institutional arrangement prevailing at the national level.   12
number of countries adopting it as, at the limit, there is no loss of effectiveness due to 
international spillover from a global package. While the total demand from emerging countries 
may be small, emerging countries tend to have larger marginal propensities to consume out of 
income and hence fiscal stimulus packages may be more effective.  Emerging countries also 
have higher propensities to import, and hence leakages may be higher, but if many countries 
pursue such packages this problem is reduced. In fact, such leakages imply that in particular the 
advanced countries will be helped. It is therefore better to err on the side of too much financing 
rather than too much adjustment under the current circumstances. Interestingly, unlike the 
traditional case for unilateral free trade, protectionist fiscal packages, at the limit the failure to 
enact fiscal stimulus policies on account of import leakages, may be in the interest of individual 
countries. This reinforces the need for multilateral institutions to guard against protectionism 
even in the best-run economies. 
Second, even if positive spillovers from financial stimulus were negligible, the threat of 
large negative spillovers as a result of the global economic crisis is credible and imminent, as the 
Great Depression experience teaches and as recent country initiatives highlight. Pressures to 
raise trade protectionism and competitive devaluations in a deflated world economy are rising 
and may lead to a global trade war that spirals out of control (World Bank, 2009). Protectionism 
rises as a countercyclical domestic policy response to the crisis as an attempt to increase 
domestic demand and production. In a global recession, such a policy response is globally 
disastrous but may be individually beneficial. Multilaterals can fight this on two fronts. First, 
they can offer financing to support individual economies as well as the global trade system. 
Second, they can make financing in situations of outright crisis conditional on avoiding such 
disruptive policy responses. There is a strong argument for action through multilateral 
institutions able to internalize international spillovers.   
Multilaterals have an opportunity to oppose protectionism in fiscal policy in this global 
recession and at the same time encourage, and finance, stimulus packages that would be 
otherwise discarded or scaled back by national authorities because boosted demand “leaks out” 
of the domestic economy. This is also an opportunity for multilaterals to coordinate global 
stimulus action. From the point of view of an individual country, a stimulus package that restricts 
spending to products with high domestic value added (in other words, impedes spending on 
imports) has a higher GDP-multiplier and can be presumed to be more beneficial in terms of   13
GDP reactivation (despite its inefficiency, like that of any other trade barrier). This would be 
appropriate for a national recession but not in the case of a global recession like the present one, 
because the reactivation of depressed GDP in the rest of the world is equally valuable from a 
global perspective.   
Multilaterals should also be mindful of the potential for policy reform backsliding due to 
instability and defend against that possibility.  The international community should be mindful of 
rewarding the good policies implemented in the past by now helping to avoid unwarranted 
external adjustments at a time of global recession that may erode the economic or political basis 
for supporting reforms. Nonetheless, in many countries macroeconomic policies have been 
insufficiently countercyclical during the boom years to create the necessary space to respond 
quickly and effectively to the global economic downturn. Similarly, multilateral conditionality in 
these cases can help assure that policy interventions that may be beneficial in the short term do 
not become important obstacles to the resumption of income and productivity growth in the 
medium to long term, as illustrated by IDB (2009b). 
 
3. How Should Multilaterals Intervene?  
 
In the current phase of the downturn, there is a premium on fast and decisive action. A consensus 
has emerged that a lack of confidence and heightened uncertainty about systemic risk is leading 
to a collapse of global economic activity and international trade. It is therefore paramount to 
move aggressively and quickly to short-circuit the negative feedback loop from tighter global 
financial conditions to a deeper world recession. Moreover, acting sooner rather than later is 
desirable also in light of the fact that traditional lending countries in the multilateral lending 
institutions are facing daunting challenges in managing their own fiscal responses to the crisis, as 
well as in light of the political backlash against financial sector support programs. The situation 
has already reached a point at which the domestic fiscal needs of advanced economies may soon 
start to crowd out possibilities for supporting emerging countries. 
A first important role of multilateral intervention is to provide a backstop for liquidity or 
lender of last resort; see Calvo (2009) for a recent note on the issue.  A traditional 
counterargument is that this may provoke moral hazard.  Several papers, however, argue that this 
is not necessarily the case. Morris and Shin (2003) and Corsetti,  Guimarães  and Roubini   
(2006) suggest that, in the presence of appropriate fiscal policy, a lender of last resort providing   14
sufficient liquidity can prevent a bad “run-equilibrium” and therefore increase rather than reduce 
the incentives for that “appropriate” fiscal policy.
9 Arozemena and Powell (2003) develop a 
repeated game, and show that assuming a lender of last resort can punish countries by removing 
its backstop, an equilibrium is supported with no moral hazard but with liquidity protection that 
prevents “runs” from occurring.
10  An interesting feature of all these theoretical models is that the 
lender of last resort does not actually have to disburse. The access to the backstop allows 
countries to roll over debt in private markets, eradicating the necessity for actual disbursements.  
A second counterargument is that risky debt appears for a reason, hence multilateral 
involvement must attempt to replace the discipline of shortening maturities for something else 
(Jeanne, 2008). In the context of the current crisis, the higher probability of a run (that is 
discipline) does not reflect a country’s poor behavior so much as the global context, hence it 
shows the limits of discipline when the shock is systemic. In a similar vein, D’Amato, Grubisic 
and Powell (1997) and Levy-Yeyati, Peria and Schmukler (2009) both suggest market discipline 
has a limit in banking when shocks are systemic. 
A second role for multilaterals is to help provide global fiscal stimulus while at the same 
time preventing an increased risk of liquidity problems or preventing the liquidity difficulties 
experienced over the past several months from turning into solvency issues, which would be 
much harder to resolve.  
At the same time, the fundamentals of the current global slowdown may themselves raise 
solvency questions. The possible permanence of some of the changes observed, such as a drop in 
unsustainably high world growth and the anticipated deleveraging in global financial markets, 
has structural, non-cyclical implications that call for adjustment to a lower-growth, medium-term 
equilibrium. The provision of financing without regard for needed adjustment would increase 
required adjustment down the road and backfire. 
International financial institutions then have multiple roles in the current circumstances, 
and the particular role to be played will depend on the situation in a specific country. These roles 
include (a) backstopping liquidity; (b) providing long-term finance, particularly for financing 
                                                       
9 In these models a “global game,” with particular assumptions regarding what lenders know about fundamentals 
and what lenders know about other lenders, supports a unique equilibrium. 
10 The one period version of this game is one where the trade-off for the lender of last resort is to provide liquidity 
protection but at the cost of moral hazard. The interesting feature is that the only equilibrium is in mixed strategies 
representing the tension between (say) the IMF wishing to provide support and a country’s being tempted to pursue 
riskier strategies in the presence of unconditional support. A “minimum punishment strategy” supports a unique 
equilibrium in the repeated game.      15
countercyclical fiscal policies and/or protecting particular fiscal expenditures (thereby altering 
the composition of fiscal expenditure); and (c) facilitating fiscal adjustment.  In what follows we 
suggest a categorization of countries to describe the potential roles of multilaterals in each.  The 
two over-arching objectives of support are first to reduce the likelihood of a crisis and second to 
attempt to maximize the number of countries that might contribute to the global efforts towards 
fiscal stimulus.  A third objective we consider important is ensuring that fiscal and expenditure 
policies are appropriately designed. 
 
A)  A country with no liquidity problems (high reserves and/or assured normal access to 
credit) 
 
In a case of financial self-sufficiency, the country may implement appropriate domestic policies 
without multilateral support.  In practice, the absence of liquidity problems in this crisis is in all 
likelihood accompanied by a fiscal situation with enough space to consider countercyclical fiscal 
and quasi-fiscal policies, as opposed to the need for fiscal retrenchment or adjustment to 
maintain fiscal sustainability. In such cases multilaterals should insist on non-protectionist 
stimulus packages but not actually intervene in order to preserve resources for the other cases 
listed below. 
 
B)  A country with fiscal space but potential liquidity problems 
 
Some countries may be considered to have fiscal space to enact a countercyclical fiscal policy 
from a solvency perspective but face a high cost of borrowing and have liquidity concerns 
(potentially insufficient reserves and a debt structure that does not eliminate liquidity risks).   In 
these cases multilaterals may play at least two important roles.  First, they may provide long-
term financing (or guarantees such that countries can finance long-term) to improve countries’ 
debt maturity structure and reduce liquidity risks.  This is particularly important to finance any 
fiscal stimulus in such a way that the country’s liquidity position does not deteriorate.  Second, 
multilaterals  may provide a back stop to reserves essentially augmenting access to international 
liquidity.  In relation to the Guidotti-Greenspan rule, all else equal, this would serve to reduce the 
denominator (the amount of liabilities coming due in one year) and increase the numerator (the 
stock of international reserves) respectively, while enabling the country to produce a strong 
countercyclical response (Fernandez-Arias and Montiel, 2009).  Multilateral development banks   16
(MDBs) currently provide longer-term financing, and so their comparative advantage is in 
relation to the first role. The second role is a natural one for the IMF to play, and for a country 
with fiscal space it is likely that there would be access to the new Flexible Credit Line (FCL) or a 
high access precautionary program.
11 In this case, multilateral intervention would have no strings 
attached to the fiscal policy package being financed other than ensuring that the package is not 
protectionist and is aligned with the multilateral effort being coordinated. 
      
C)  A country with no fiscal space and potential liquidity problems 
 
Unfortunately, many emerging countries simply do not have the fiscal space to effect a counter-
cyclical fiscal policy, and indeed they should be deterred from doing so. In fact, several countries 
may need to adjust fiscal policy to reduce deficits given the negative impact of the global crisis 
on the prices of key exports and the resulting decline in fiscal revenues.  In these cases 
multilaterals may again provide a backstop to reserves and longer-term financing, but this should 
be offered on the basis of the typical “no-new-debt rule.”  In other words, multilateral financing 
should replace rather than add to market debt. In the case of countries where adjustment is 
required, multilateral financing may help with the fulfillment of public sector borrowing 
requirements in order to avoid the costs of abrupt adjustment, but within a framework designed 
to reduce fragility and regain fiscal sustainability. This implies agreed-upon budget envelopes 
that permit gradual adjustment to a new medium-term budget equilibrium. Indeed, support 
should be non-precautionary, with ex post conditionality under this modality. 
Again providing a back stop to reserves is a natural role for the IMF.  Countries in this 
category would not qualify for the FCL, but most would be advised to seek a traditional Stand 
By facility. The IMF is also the agency charged with assessing the fiscal situation and advising 
on the macroeconomic adjustment effort that may be required.  MDBs again have a comparative 
advantage in supplying long-term development financing and should work with countries to 
ensure that resources are employed as efficiently and effectively as possible. For example, they 
focus on the development effectiveness of public investment and development policy as well as 
structural reforms fostering growth and fiscal discipline. Furthermore, expenditures that protect 
vulnerable groups should be maintained as far as is feasible. 
                                                       
11 Note however that as long as the country is free to use international reserves for budget support, both roles are 
formally equivalent from a financial viewpoint.  Under those conditions, the role of the MDBs in this equation is to 
ensure whatever fiscal space there is, is used appropriately in sound operations. In order for the opinions of these 
institutions to be heard it is surely the case that they should have resources committed.   17
 
D)    A country with more serious sustainability problems 
 
A smaller set of emerging countries have more serious issues in relation to the sustainability of 
policies given debt levels.  The current crisis is putting countries in this category in an extremely 
difficult position.  At some point the question may become whether to adjust fiercely or combine 
a smaller adjustment with a debt restructuring.  This places multilaterals in a difficult position.  
Should they lend to countries that may face a debt restructuring, or should they hold off—which   
would most likely force the restructuring to occur?  The lack of a framework in the current 
international financial architecture for countries to restructure debts akin to corporate debt 
restructurings (such as Chapter 11 in the United States) tends to make multilaterals very reluctant 
to cease financing.  However, at some point the restructuring may become inevitable, and in 
general it is optimal to restructure early rather than delay.  Moreover, if core financial markets 
are closed in any event, restructuring may not imply severe short-term costs. In any event, it is 
clear that multilateral intervention in a country with solvency problems needs to provide for both 
an agreed framework for fiscal adjustment and potential debt restructuring.            
In summary, in a phase of impending downturn, heavy ex-post conditionality is not 
warranted except for insolvency cases in which there are few incentives to use additional 
liquidity productively. In these cases, traditional ex post conditionality is still justified to ensure 
the effectiveness of the financial support to countries. Other than that, financing should be made 
available on the basis of ex-ante conditionality under the liberal concepts of “good performer” 
and “sustainable framework.” The gain from advancing the reform agenda through conditionality 
(extracting a conditionality concession in exchange of support) pales in comparison with the risk 
of impeding the success of swift crisis support through delay or lack of cooperation.  
Implicit ex ante conditionality is appropriate. To reward past good policies, multilaterals 
should lend more and more freely than in the past, provided that such support should be 
accompanied by appropriate monitoring to ensure that policies remain on track and support is 
productive (Jeanne, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer, 2008). Countries with sizable debts that are able to 
commit to policies of fiscal discipline in the future and save in the subsequent boom phase of the 
cycle should receive higher levels of financing on account of their enhanced fiscal sustainability. 
In that case, additional financing could be attached to conditions that preserve and enhance 
medium term sustainability.   18
One exception, however, is the condition that all types of multilateral financial support 
must go exclusively to countries that refrain from protectionist measures. This blanket condition 
is justified because, in the context of a global crisis, protectionism to safeguard local demand 
may be in each country’s individual interest, but at the expense of the collective good. So the 
effort would be geared toward preventing the adoption of measures disruptive of the 
international prosperity. 
Indeed, the recent change in the IMF’s lending toolkit goes precisely in this direction. 
And perhaps even too much in this direction, as in practice it will be difficult to differentiate 
conditionality across member countries, while some cases would still benefit from the 
commitment device provided by traditional ex post conditionality.  
  
4. What is the Specific Role of Multilateral Development Banks?  
 
By virtue of their countercyclical lending at medium and long-term maturities, MDBs play a 
supporting role to the IMF’s pivotal role of backstopping liquidity.  In fact, in small countries, 
MDBs can also aim at covering balance of payments and general budget support, including 
funding domestic financial intermediation, at a systemic level. Besides this supporting role, 
however, MDBs have specific roles concerning the development effectiveness of multilateral 
financing.  
A strategic objective of MDBs is helping to design appropriate expenditure composition 
policies and, when warranted, expenditure-increasing policies in order to protect social programs 
and enhance medium-term productivity growth.
12 For example, a specific objective of MDBs is 
to protect the tremendous social progress of the past several years by providing targeted financial 
support for the most effective social protection programs. Such an effort is crucial in helping to 
make prudent economic policies politically sustainable until the world economy becomes more 
stable and resumes growing. MDB activity in these areas can also help to avoid perverse 
incentives, particularly in the labor market, that may increase informality, with negative 
implications for medium-term growth. Another priority area is infrastructure investment, as 
protecting large national investment programs may provide additional automatic stabilization to 
the economy during the downturn and can also set the stage for a smooth recovery once demand 
                                                       
12 See García (2009) for a more technical discussion of the modalities of fiscal stimulus in LAC.    19
resumes growing globally. These objectives apply not only to the national government but also 
to subnational governments. 
MDBs should also focus on development-oriented structural reforms through policy-
based loans.  These include policy and institutional reform aimed at fostering productivity and 
growth in the private sector as well as the reform of the State to better fulfill its development 
role, including fiscal discipline. For example, MDBs can help ensure that “transitory” measures, 
such as quasi-fiscal credit policies, are credibly transitory. More generally, MDBs would focus 
on the reform of fiscal institutions to ensure fiscal discipline and soundness in support of 
development objectives. While the IMF is the agency in charge of monitoring the budget 
envelope in the short run, MDBs should focus on reforms that would generate better frameworks 
for fiscal policy. 
Finally, MDBs may also be effective partners of bilateral donors who want to help 
achieve critical mass coordinating around an overall plan to address cyclical financial needs or 
other sector-specific objectives, including serving as a financial conduit on their behalf without 
any balance sheet burden.  
 
5. Is it Feasible to Gear Up Multilateral Lending Substantially?  
 
Preventing or supporting external adjustment in the developing world with targeted multilaterally 
financed programs may remain feasible, even at the current level of capitalization, provided the 
temporary exceptional financing promised at the recent G20 meeting materializes in full. For 
instance, lending to finance fiscal stimulus and backstopping liquidity to the tune of, say 2-3 
percentage points of GDP pale in comparison with the gap that would be produced if a financial 
collapse were to occur in the near future, with historical average stabilization packages of 5-10 
points of GDP. Nonetheless, financing is endogenous to the severity of the crisis. So it is useful 
to think about other ways to expand demand and contain supply of resources for multilateral 
intervention regardless of the envelop size at any point in time.  
To expand the supply of multilateral financing, multilateral financial institutions should 
therefore use their balance sheets creatively to the extent possible. In a process of global 
deleveraging and global credit deterioration, they could use their preferred creditor status, 
combined with their ability to affect the international regulatory standards at the global level, to 
leverage their balance sheet above normal criteria on a temporary basis. The alternative is that   20
countries do that individually, lending directly to potentially insolvent households and firms, and 
hence increasing the probability of bigger country busts in the future.   
Second, the existing system of bilateral insurance agreements between systematically 
important EMs and all of the G3 central banks should be strengthened. Brazil and Mexico in 
LAC, for instance, should seek to establish arrangements with the European Central Bank and 
the Bank of Japan similar to those established with the Federal Reserve Board. Similarly, there is 
scope for strengthening sub-regional arrangements such as the Fondo Latinoamericano de 
Reservas (FLAR) and the Corporacón Andina de Fomento (CAF) as a complement rather than a 
substitute to multilateral assistance. Nonetheless, as shown by the experience of Asian countries, 
barring individual countries’ accumulating cushions of global dimensions, regional arrangements 
cannot effectively insulate against global shocks. 
Third, and more generally, there are two distinct sources of foreign liquidity that should 
be recycled to global capital markets through institutional arrangements. The first is the 
traditional recycling of hard currency from countries underrepresented in the multilateral system 
but with large stocks of foreign reserves. The second is recycling of G3 funds attracted by the 
flight to quality. Both types of recycling, as with petrodollars in the 1970s, could simply be 
channeled through the IMF, as Japan, the United States, the Euro zone and a few other countries 
are doing. However, there are also alternative proposals on the table, such as setting floors on 
emerging market assets prices similar to those being implemented for toxic assets in the United 
States. Both recycling mechanisms can provide arrangements serving the objectives of both 
borrowers and lenders in a global crisis. 
As discussed above, a way to contain demand of multilateral financing is to use the crisis 
as an opportunity to engage in institutional reform by establishing a credible commitment to 
strengthen future fiscal balances along the lines of a structural fiscal framework. The key would 
be to establish an independent and reputable agency to produce and disclose the structural 
position of the fiscal accounts in such a way that national debate on fiscal aggregates revolves 
around these structural estimations. The benefits are clear. First, it is efficient because it allows 
the stabilization of tax rates and public spending. Second, it would enlarge the sustainability 
space and allow a larger scope for a countercyclical response in the current downturn, be it a 
stimulus package or a shallower adjustment. Third, and related, such an approach would attract 
more financing from the market. Not only are the benefits clear, but the time is also right from a   21
political economy viewpoint. The implementation of a structural fiscal framework in this 
downturn would not come accompanied by an adjustment to the current fiscal balance, as would 
happen in boom times, but rather with a friendly expansion. 
Several other actions may help contain the cost of multilateral intervention. First, it is 
important to persuade individual countries to go to multilaterals sooner rather than later. 
Specifically, there is a need for peer pressure: leading emerging economies in the G20 should be 
encouraged to go to the IMF early, while the large bilateral donors should make it a condition for 
support, especially now that the arsenal of lending facilities of the IMF has been modified in the 
right direction. MDBs could be an intermediary to facilitate this process rather than being used as 
an alternative to avoid going to the IMF. Moreover, the so-called stigma problem is misleading 
in the current circumstances.  As the recent examples of Mexico and Poland illustrate, the world 
economy is in a state in which markets would likely cheer similar initiatives and would take a 
benign view of countries that try to move proactively.  
It is also important to prioritize countries and activities, recognizing systemic relevance 
and matching country size with appropriate source of support. There are applicable operational 
notions of country vulnerability, but the current circumstances require a notion of “systemic 
relevance.” In other words, there is a need to distinguish systemically important countries or 
systematically important activities in certain countries. Moreover, we need to differentiate large 
from small countries to treat them differently because magnitudes are too great in systematically 
important countries.  
Under either modality of fiscal support discussed above, reserves or budget support, there 
are risks that intervention remains inadequate if it is limited to fiscal concerns. As there are 
competing demands on limited stocks of foreign reserves or lines of credit in hard currency, the 
issue arises of how to prioritize them. Obviously, official reserves are needed to lean against the 
wind and smooth changes in the equilibrium real exchange rate. They must also be used to roll 
over public sector debt coming due in foreign currency (and possibly domestic currency, when 
monetizing the debt poses significant inflationary risks). Foreign currency liquidity may be 
needed to provide credit to the private sector previously provided by private foreign and 
domestic residents, or to facilitate the rollover of private sector liabilities in case the shock were 
to be very protracted. In past episodes of Sudden Stops, for instance, it has proven to be crucial   22
to support trade credits (such as in the case of Brazil in 2002).
13 In the current environment, 
protecting domestic credit growth to small and medium enterprises likely to be rationed out of 
the market may be equally important. Finally, additional potential claims on reserves include the 
provision of foreign currency liquidity to the banking sector if it is under stress from the deposit 
side of the balance sheet (as in Uruguay in 2002) or from the pulling back of foreign lines of 
credit.  
In practice, with scarce hard currency resources, support must be prioritized. In fact, in 
addition to fiscal stimulus and backstopping liquidity, there is a need to preserve the flow of 
private credit. As part of this attempt, multilaterals may be backing active financial policies of 
directed lending, either through public or private banks. A multilaterally financed initiative is 
more likely to be successful, as country-led initiatives risk running out of money before the crisis 
is over. Given that countries are directing lending into economies with increasing insolvency, 
there is a risk that once they were to run out of own resources, they would face a much worse 
situation. 
To be sure, it is important to avoid the institutional arrangement that emerged for the 
international trade regime whereby progress (or lack thereof) with multilateral liberalization has 
been crowded out by a proliferation of bilateral trade agreements. Also, tied bilateral financial 
aid in this context may serve as a cloak for protectionism on the part of the donor. Multilateral 
institutions ought to remain central and guarantee a level playing field by requiring bilateral 
arrangements to abide by common principles. 
 
6. Looking Ahead 
 
Full reform and recapitalization of the multilateral financial institutions cannot be put in place in 
time to avert the spreading of the current crisis, but it should be an objective for the post crisis 
era. The current situation does not provide time to change the international financial architecture, 
but we should not lose sight of the shortcomings of the system for post-crisis reform. 
The secular increase in international financial integration requires a recapitalization of the 
system regardless of the need to intervene in response to the current crisis. The current crisis, 
however, has vividly exposed the risks associated with the notion that an increased role of 
                                                       
13 Protecting trade credits was vital during Sudden Stops as their disappearance constraints further the availability of 
foreign currency in the domestic market.   23
private capital markets justifies moving toward elimination of public sector intervention in the 
form of multilateral surveillance and lending. The global nature of the current crisis that is 
affecting all countries in all regions at the same time, albeit in slightly different manners across 
countries, strengthens this case and calls for an urgent response.
14   
The governance structure of the multilateral system is also inadequate. The international 
monetary system is one in which countries that have embraced globalization and are now in large 
and persistent international creditor positions hold such small stakes in the system that they o 
have no incentive to participate fully, or assurance that will be able to do so—including by 
means such as putting significant resources at the system’s disposal. Vice versa, countries that 
are progressively less integrated into the world economy continue to be overrepresented in the 
system by virtue of arcane and outdated representation formulas. The G20 represents an 
interesting development in this regard and is a natural forum for discussions between creditor 
and borrower nations. 
 There is also an urgent need to revisit multilateral policies on crisis prevention and crisis 
resolution. First, it is important to foster the emergence of country insurance products for crisis 
prevention. The most effective way of securing countercyclical financing to countries in need is 
not through ex-post multilateral lending, but instead through ex-ante establishment of contingent 
contracts that deliver countercyclical private financing. Contingent contracts transferring 
resources to countries in the event of low export prices or generalized credit rationing in 
international financial markets, to mention two examples of relevant exogenous shocks, would 
amount to automatic financial stabilizers. Multilateral financial institutions have a role to play in 
helping to develop these instruments, which would entail a contingent increase in their balance 
sheet exposure in exchange for a reduction in the capital needed to provide countercyclical 
financing. If the private sector is successfully engaged in participating in these country insurance 
schemes, the multilateral capital required to address countercyclical needs would be minimized.
15 
Of course, countercyclical lending is premised on the assumption of procyclical repayments. 
                                                       
14 Recent theoretical analysis of multilateral and commercial lending confirms the social optimality of the former, 
given the pro-cyclicality of the latter (Boz, 2009). 
15 The argument has been made that contingent private loans would have the effect of private creditors lowering 
their country credit ceilings anticipating future overindebtedness, without changing the fundamental problem. 
Derivatives that do not create debt but simply transfer resources ex-post, such as insurance or swaps, may be more 
attractive in this regard.   24
This implies adequate terms of lending to match the required cyclical flows and clarity about the 
countercyclical purpose of these facilities. 
Second, discussions on institutional arrangements for crisis resolution should resume in 
earnest. Unfortunately there remains a gaping hole in the international financial architecture in 
relation to debt restructuring, and the international community’s heralded “solution” of 
Collective Action Clauses still appears inadequate to deal with these cases.  This implies that 
countries forced by the current crisis to restructure debt obligations will likely see “punishment” 
far out of proportion to their “crime” and far more suffering than if a comprehensive resolution 
technique such as an efficient bankruptcy resolution procedure had been put in place. There is 
still much work to be done here, as unfortunately may become evident if the world economy 
does not improve relatively soon and debt restructuring become necessary in critical cases.   25
References 
 
Arozamena, L., and A. Powell. 2003. “Liquidity Protection versus Moral Hazard: The Role of 
the IMF.” Journal of International Money and Finance 22(7): 1041-1063.  
Benigno, G., H. Chen, C. Otrok, A. Rebucci, and E. R. Young. 2009. “Optimal Stabilization 
Policy with Occasionally Binding Financial Frictions.” Washington, DC, United States: 
Inter-American Development Bank. Unpublished manuscript. 
Boz, E. 2009. “Sovereign Default, Private Sector Creditors and the IFIs.” IMF Working Paper 
09/46. Washington, DC, United States: International Monetary Fund. 
Braggion, F., L. Christiano and J. Roldos. 2005. “Optimal Monetary Policy in a ‘Sudden Stop.’” 
NBER Working Paper 13254. Cambridge, United States: National Bureau of Economic 
Research.  
Calvo, G. 2009.  “Lender of Last Resort: Put It on the Agenda.” Vox, 23 March. Available at: 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3327 
Catão, L., and A. Chang. 2009. “Food Prices and Monetary Policy.” Washington, DC, United 
States: Inter-American Development Bank. Unpublished manuscript. 
Catão, L., A. Pagán and D. Laxton.  2008. “Monetary Transmission in an Emerging Targeter: 
The Case of Brazil.” IMF Working Paper 08/191. Washington, DC, United States: 
International Monetary Fund.  
Cavallo, E., and A. Izquierdo, editors. 2009. Dealing with an International Credit Crunch: 
Policy Responses to Sudden Stops in Latin America. Washington, DC, United States: 
Inter-American Development Bank.  
Corsetti, G., B. Guimarães and N. Roubini. 2006. “International Lending of Last Resort and 
Moral Hazard: A Model of IMF’s Catalytic Finance.” Journal of Monetary Economics 
53(3): 441-471.  
Cúrdia, V., and M. Woodford.  2009. “Credit Frictions and Optimal monetary policy,” BIS 
Working Paper 278. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements.  
D’Amato, L., E. Grubisic and A. Powell. 1997. “Contagion, Banks Fundamentals or 
Macroeconomic Shock? An Empirical Analysis of the Argentine 1995 Banking 
Problems.” Working Paper 2. Available at www.bcra.gov.ar/pdfs/invest/trabajo2.pdf. 
G20.  1998. “Report on the Working Group on International Financial Crises.” Available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/othp01.htm   26
Gamberoni E., and R. Newfarmer. 2009.  “Trade Protection: Incipient but Worrisome Trends.” 
Trade Note 37. Washington, DC, United States: World Bank: International Trade 
Department.  http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/Trade_Note_37.pdf  
García, G. 2009. “¿Qué hacer y qué no hacer en política fiscal durante la actual crisis 
internacional?” Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank. 
Unpublished manuscript.   
Fernández-Arias, E., and P. Montiel. 2009.  “Crisis Response in Latin America: Is the ‘Rainy 
Day’ at Hand?” Research Department Working Paper 686. 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 2008. “All that Glitters May Not be Gold: Assessing 
Latin America’s Recent Macroeconomic Performance.” Washington, DC, United States: 
IDB.  
----. 2009a. “Policy Trade-offs for Unprecedented Times: Confronting the Global Crisis in Latin 
America and the Caribbean.” Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB).  
----. 2009b. “Social and Labor Market Policies for Tumultuous Times: Confronting the Global 
Crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean.” Washington, DC, United States: Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB).  
Jeanne, O. 2008. “Debt Maturity and the International Financial Architecture.” Forthcoming in 
American Economic Review.   
Jeanne, O., J. Ostry and J. Zettelmeyer. 2008.  “A Theory of International Crisis Lending and 
IMF Conditionality.” IMF Working Paper 08/236.Washington, DC, United States: 
International Monetary Fund. 
Miskin, F. 2009. “Is Monetary Policy Effective During Financial Crises?” NBER Working Paper 
14678. Cambridge, United States: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Morris S., and H.S. Shin. 2003. “Catalytic Finance: When Does it Work?” Cowles Foundation 
Discussion Paper 1400. New Haven, United States: Yale Cowles Foundation for 
Research in Economics. 
Ortiz, A., P. Ottonello, F. Sturzenegger. 2009.  “Monetary and Fiscal Policies in a Sudden Stop: 
Is Tighter Brighter?” In: E. Cavallo and A. Izquierdo, editors. Dealing with an 
International Credit Crunch: Policy Responses to Sudden Stops in Latin America. 
Washington, DC, United States: Inter-American Development Bank.   27
Schmukler, S.L., E. Levy-Yeyati and M.S. Martínez Peria. 2004. “Market Discipline under 
Systemic Risk: Evidence from Bank Runs in Emerging Economies.” Econometric 
Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 318. http://www.bis.org/bcbs/events/rtf04schmukler.pdf 
 